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The Effect of European Intellectual Property Institutions on Chinese 
Outward Foreign Direct Investment 
(Running Head: The Effect of European IP Institutions on Chinese OFDI) 
ABSTRACT 
This study examines the role of the strength of the Intellectual Property (IP) institutions of 23 
European countries in attracting Chinese Outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) during 
the time period 2003-2015. Following a dynamic panel data analysis methodology, we find 
that the strength of IP institutions has a positive effect in attracting higher levels of OFDI from 
China. This is an important finding for the OFDI literature from emerging markets, since 
previous studies have researched this relationship from the OFDI perspective of developed 
countries. However, we also find a weak indication of a potential U-shaped relationship 
between the strength of IP institutions and Chinese OFDI. To better understand this 
relationship, we interact a European country’s membership in the Former Eastern Bloc (FEB) 
with the strength of IP institutions and find a negative moderating effect. We therefore find 
that when investing in FEB countries, Chinese firms are attracted to weaker levels of IP 
institutional strength. The results of this study have important implications for future studies 
on the determinants of OFDI from emerging markets, as well as for European and Chinese 
businesses and policy-makers concerning the importance of IP institutional strength. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper investigates the effect of the strength of European Intellectual Property (IP) 
institutions on Chinese Outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI). Over the last two decades, 
the role of the strength of IP institutions of host countries in attracting or discouraging Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) has gained increasing attention in the literature (Branstetter, Fisman, 
Foley, & Saggi, 2007; Khoury & Peng, 2011; Lee & Mansfield, 1996). This is because the 
strength of IP institutions can determine the extent to which firms can protect against IP 
infringement and effectively exploit their IP assets in a host country (Oxley, 1999). Most 
studies in the existing literature focus on the strength of the regulatory structure of IP 
institutions (law on the books) and find a positive effect in attracting OFDI from developed 
countries, such as the US (Lee & Mansfield, 1996; Nicholson, 2007; Seyoum, 2006). However, 
there are two recent developments in the international business environment that have not been 
addressed by the existing literature to date.  
First, Chinese OFDI activities have grown exponentially after China joined the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001, with Chinese OFDI flows in Europe reaching  
US$55 billion in 2014 (Le Corre & Sepulchre, 2016). While expanding abroad, Chinese firms 
have also placed emphasis on building their portfolios of IP assets to support their business 
models. This is reflected in the growth of patent applications by Chinese residents in China, 
from 58,757 in 2003 to 1,010,406 in 2015. Many of these patent applications were also filed in 
the IP institutions of foreign countries, with the numbers rising from 1,707 applications in 2003 
to 42,154 in 2015 (WIPO, 2017). In fact, the number of Chinese patents filed abroad is 
nowadays similar to this from France, whose firms filed for 46,581 patents abroad in the year 
2015 (WIPO, 2016). This suggests that Chinese OFDI in European countries includes 
investments from firms that have already established and growing (often through acquisitions) 
IP portfolios. Such investments are spread throughout Europe: examples include the 
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establishment of greenfield Research and Development (R&D) centres, such as Yili Dairy’s 
development of an R&D centre in the Netherlands (Wageningen University, 2014), Huawei’s 
establishment of 18 R&D centres in Europe (Huawei Europe, 2015) and Changan Automotive's 
development of two R&D centres in the UK and Italy (Changan UK, 2017). Other Chinese 
investments aim to exploit their existing IP supported business models in Europe, as well as 
acquire and exploit European IP assets such as the acquisition of Imagination Technologies 
(the IP rich UK designer of graphic processors) by the Chinese firm Canyon Bridge (Bradshaw, 
2017). Chinese OFDI also includes investments from less innovative firms that compete with 
IP light business models and aim to expand and capture market share in European markets. 
Therefore, the strength of IP institutions of host European countries could influence the 
effectiveness with which Chinese firms protect their IP and appropriate the returns from their 
investments in the development and exploitation of IP assets in Europe. However, there is 
currently no study in the existing literature (to our knowledge) on the effect of the strength of 
IP institutions on Chinese OFDI, or from emerging markets (EMs) in general.   
Second, after the signing of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPs) agreement, the strength of the IP regulatory institutions of most developed and 
developing countries that are members of WTO is now relatively harmonised (Peng, Ahlstrom, 
Carraher, & Shi, 2017). In contrast, the effectiveness with which the IP institutional agents 
enforce IP law in practice varies significantly in most WTO member countries (Brander, Cui, 
& Vertinsky, 2017; Papageorgiadis, Cross, & Alexiou, 2014). This is because the effectiveness 
of IP enforcement related institutional agents in a country is influenced by the underpinning 
norms and social cognitions regarding the legitimacy and acceptability of the IP regulatory 
environment. Although the TRIPs agreement introduced significant reforms to the IP 
regulatory environments of all WTO member countries, the new laws and regulations imposed 
by TRIPs are (often) foreign to the existing normative and cognitive IP institutional structures 
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of a country (Brander et al., 2017). As a result, the IP enforcement agents of a country can often 
not perceive the post-TRIPs legal and regulatory reforms as fully acceptable and legitimate. 
Such an incongruence can affect the level and extent to which the IP institutional agents are 
committed to dedicating resources and effectively enforcing IP law in practice (Yang, Fryxell, 
& Sie, 2008). Since existing studies mainly focus on the effect of the regulatory structure of IP 
institutions, it is important in the post-TRIPs context to gain a better understanding of the effect 
of IP institutional strength on OFDI. 
We take into consideration the above two developments and make two contributions to the 
literature by studying the effect of the strength of the IP institutions of 23 European countries 
on Chinese OFDI over the years 2003-2015. With regards to the first contribution of the study, 
we focus on the strength of enforcement related aspects of European IP institutions and find 
that it has a positive effect (at the 5% level) on Chinese OFDI, which suggests that higher levels 
of IP institutional strength in a host country lead to higher levels of Chinese OFDI. Chinese 
companies are found to prefer operating in strong IP institutions, where they can successfully 
defend and exploit their internally developed or acquired IP assets. This is the first study on IP 
institutions and OFDI from the perspective of an emerging economy and the result is aligned 
with the existing literature on the effect of IP institutions on OFDI from developed countries 
(Nicholson, 2007; Seyoum, 2006; Smarzynska Javorcik, 2004). However, the results also 
reveal some weak evidence of a U-shaped relationship (at the 10% level) between the strength 
of IP institutions and Chinese OFDI. This leads us to the second contribution of this study, 
where in the process of finding more evidence to explain the potential of a U-shaped 
relationship, we find that a country’s membership to the Former Eastern Bloc (FEB) negatively 
moderates the effect (at the 5% level) of the strength of IP institutions on Chinese OFDI. The 
findings suggest that when investing in countries that were members of the FEB, Chinese 
companies prefer to invest in weaker IP institutions. This is because the general institutional 
5 
 
 
normative and cognitive structures of FEB countries have many similarities to those of China, 
due to FEB and Chinese institutions going through the process of transitioning from centrally 
planned to market economies. In FEB countries therefore, Chinese firms are found to prefer 
weak levels of IP institutional strength, since the weak levels of IP institutional strength can be 
more predictable (in terms of ineffectiveness) and the risk of facing major disruption from a 
potential IP infringement lawsuit from competitors is lower. Importantly, through exercising 
their strong skills in developing informal network ties, Chinese firms can expect that they could 
influence enforcement related IP institutional agents in a FEB host country with weak IP 
institutional strength and achieve their desired institutional conditions of a predictably weak 
appropriability regime. Overall, the contributions of this study provide important insights 
regarding the effects of variable levels of IP institutional strength on Chinese OFDI, and allow 
us to draw managerial and policy-making implications. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
IP Institutions  
Institutions are human and social constructs which determine the rules, procedures, powers of 
enforcement and norms of behaviour that constrain and guide human and organisational 
behaviour (North, 1990). Specifically, Scott (1995: 53) defines institutions as “regulative, 
normative and cognitive structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social 
behaviour”. Following Scott’s (1995) definition, the regulative structure of institutions consists 
of laws, explicit regulations and supporting structures which aim to provide a stable and 
transparent environment to the economic actors transacting within the boundaries of an 
institution (Orr & Scott, 2008). The regulative structure of an institution relates to laws and 
regulations that are set by the government of a country and the governmental bodies/agencies 
which carry oversight and administration responsibilities. The regulative structure includes the 
legislative framework which, for example, details the administrative and enforcement 
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procedures in a country. The normative structure includes tacit values and rules that are 
established and integrated within an institution, which determine what the institutional players 
consider as legitimate and acceptable practice (Scott, 1995). The cognitive structure relates to 
societal values and includes the perceptions and explanations of social reality as seen by actors 
operating within the institution (Scott, 1995). The normative and cognitive structures jointly 
determine the extent to which the requirements set by the regulative structure are perceived as 
legitimate and acceptable by the institutional actors who carry out the enforcement of the 
regulations in practice (such as the judiciary, police and customs enforcement agencies). The 
extent to which the normative and cognitive structures are aligned (or not) with the regulative 
structure therefore influences the actual efforts of the institutional actors in effectively 
enforcing the regulations. This is because when the normative and cognitive structures are 
incongruent or competing with the regulative structure, activities that are illegal according to 
the law on the books can be seen as legitimate and be tolerated by the enforcement related 
institutional actors (Justin, Tihanyi, Ireland, & Sirmon, 2009). In this case, the normative and 
cognitive institutions undermine the regulatory structure of an institution and lead to the 
ineffective enforcement of the law in practice.  
Following the definition by Scott (1995), IP institutions are comprised of the regulative 
structure, which relates to IP specific regulations and the normative and cognitive structures 
that determine the perceived legitimacy and acceptability of the IP regulations by the 
institutional actors who operate within the IP institution and are responsible to enforce the 
regulations in practice. The regulative structures of IP institutions of countries that are members 
of the WTO have significantly changed after the signing of the TRIPs agreement in 1994. The 
TRIPs agreement required signatory countries to undertake significant reforms in their IP 
regulatory institutions “…to adapt their laws to the minimum standards of IPR (intellectual 
property rights) protection” (WHO, 2017). The aim of the TRIPs agreement was to uniformly 
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strengthen and achieve a relative harmonization of the regulative structures of the IP 
institutions of WTO member countries (Grossman & Lai, 2004). In particular, the TRIPs 
agreement determined the minimum regulatory framework that the signatory countries are 
obliged to offer. The adoption of such regulatory reforms was a significant task for most 
developing countries such as China, which needed to adopt significant changes in its IP 
regulatory institution (Thomas, 2017). After implementing the TRIPs agreement however, 
China now offers a regulatory system that is often commented as being well crafted and aligned 
with the WTO expectations (Peng et al., 2017; Taubman, Wager, & Watal, 2012). 
The strengthening policy trajectory of signatory countries that reformed their IP regulatory 
institutions after TRIPs led to most countries offering similar levels of availability of IP law on 
the books. This is clearly illustrated by the latest scores of the index of patent protection by 
Park (2008), which counts the existence (or not) of specific patent related laws and standards 
but does not capture the effectiveness with which these laws are enforced in practice (Brander 
et al., 2017; Maskus, 2014). 1 Depending on the number of available laws, the IP regulative 
institutions of countries in the Park (2008) index receive a score between 0 to 5, where a score 
of 5 indicates to countries offering strong patent protection (in terms of availability of patent 
law on the books) and a score of 0 indicates to countries offering weak (or non-existent) patent 
protection. For example, in 2005 and 2010, FEB countries, such as Poland, achieved high 
scores that are similar to the level of regulatory protection of most European countries, with 
minimal/minor score differences. This suggests that the TRIPs reforms have now achieved a 
relative harmonization of the regulatory structures of most developed and developing countries 
                                                          
1
 The latest scores of the index of patent protection for the year 2010 are made available in 
Professor Park’s (2017) personal website.  
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which are members of the WTO, especially in terms of a high level of minimum IPR legal 
standards (Papageorgiadis et al., 2014; Peng et al., 2017). 
-------------------------------------Insert Table 1 here------------------------------------- 
In contrast, the normative and cognitive structures of IP institutions continue to vary 
significantly between countries. This is because while the TRIPs agreement set obligations 
about IP law on the books in relation to the available legal mechanisms for the enforcement of 
IP (which is part of to the regulatory structure of the institution), it did not set any obligations 
about how IP law should be enforced in practice by the IP institutional agents (Taubman et al., 
2012). The intensity and extent of implementation of IP law in practice therefore depend on 
the IP institutional agents and on the way that the normative and cognitive structures of the IP 
institution are aligned with the regulatory structure. Such an alignment is particularly important 
for IP institutions, since the regulatory structures of most countries have been developed “…in 
response to externally imposed requirements for joining the WTO…” and not in accordance to 
a country’s established IP normative and cognitive structures (Brander et al., 2017: 9). The IP 
normative and cognitive structures influence the institutional agents involved in the 
enforcement of IP in three ways. First, the two institutional structures determine the level and 
extent to which the government and public enforcement authorities consider it to be a legitimate 
and acceptable practice to enforce IP rights. This affects the level and extent to which official 
authorities actively engage with IP owners and are committed to dedicate resources for 
monitoring markets and prosecuting identified cases of IP infringement (Yang et al., 2008). 
Second, perceptions concerning the legitimacy and acceptability of IP influence the 
effectiveness of a country’s judicial system in terms of its efficiency, fairness and imposition 
of appropriate penalties that can deter convicted parties from repeating the infringement of IP 
(Ostergard, 2000; Papageorgiadis et al., 2014; Yang et al., 2008). Third, the normative and 
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cognitive structures also influence the effectiveness of other private and public agencies that 
administer IP rights such as the IP office of a country, in terms of its efficiency, stringency and 
transparency in order to guarantee that the administration process is fair, certain and predictable 
(Papageorgiadis et al., 2014).  
Overall, in countries where the normative and cognitive structures are aligned with the 
regulatory structure of the IP institutions, the IP institutional agents are expected to effectively 
enforce IP law in practice. Firms can therefore anticipate to face limited transaction costs and 
smoothly and effectively enforce their IP against infringing firms when they operate in 
countries where the institutional structures are aligned (Papageorgiadis et al., 2014). In 
contrast, firms can anticipate high transaction costs and limited effectiveness in enforcing their 
IP when operating in countries where the institutional structures are incongruent. The cross-
country differences in the effectiveness of enforcing IP rights worldwide are illustrated in the 
index of patent systems strength by Papageorgiadis et al. (2014). In this index, countries 
achieve scores in the range of 0 to 10, where high scores indicate IP institutions where the 
enforcement of patent rights is effective and patent owners experience low transactions costs, 
and vice versa. As illustrated in Table 2, the strength of enforcement in IP institutions varies 
significantly between the same countries presented in Table 1. Contrary to the regulatory 
structure of IP institutions, FEB countries achieved low scores that are clearly different when 
compared to the level of enforcement effectiveness of other European countries, with 
major/medium score differences. This suggests that while TRIPs reduced some of the 
regulatory variance between IP institutions, differences in effectiveness still prevail (Kanwar 
& Evenson, 2009). The regulative structure provides the foundation for a strong IP institution, 
however it needs to be amalgamated with effective and efficient IP enforcement efforts by the 
relevant institutional actors. While IP systems internationally have achieved a relative 
regulatory harmonisation of their minimum standards, the effectiveness of enforcement which 
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is underpinned by the normative and cognitive structures of IP institutions continues to differ 
considerably. Therefore, in the post-TRIPs implementation period, the normative and cognitive 
structures have an important, dominant role in determining the effectiveness of IP institutions. 
-------------------------------------Insert Table 2 here------------------------------------- 
The Effect of IP Institutions on FDI 
FDI theory suggests that the efficient functioning of institutions has a positive influence on the 
location selection, mode of entry and technology transfer strategies of multinational firms 
(Dunning, 2006; Guler & Guillén, 2010; Henisz & Swaminathan, 2008). This is because well 
established, strong institutions are associated with a stable and low transaction cost investment 
environment (Delios & Henisz, 2003; Lu, Liu, Filatotchev, & Wright, 2014; Meyer, Estrin, 
Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009). As Dunning (2006: 210) highlighted: “…the extent, content and 
quality of a country’s institutions and their upgrading, as they affect each and every individual 
and organization involved in the wealth creating process, are likely to impact seriously on the 
quantity and form of inbound – and for that matter outbound – TNC activity…”. Similar to 
other institutions, strong IP institutions can lower the levels of transaction costs of IP owners 
who engage with the IP institution, reduce uncertainties and therefore attract FDI. Given that 
the regulative IP structures of most host countries have significantly strengthened after TRIPs, 
FDI will depend on the level of effectiveness of IP institutional agents in enforcing IP as 
determined by the underpinning normative and cognitive institutional structures.  
Over the last 25 years the role of strong IP institutions in attracting or discouraging FDI 
globally has attracted significant attention from international business researchers. Empirical 
studies have focused either on the effect of IP institutions on inward FDI from multiple 
countries or on the effect of IP institutions on the OFDI originating from one country. With 
regards to the effect of IP on inward FDI, a number of mainly pre-TRIPs studies have used 
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multi-country samples and provided empirical evidence that strong IP institutions particularly 
in developing countries have a positive effect on attracting inward FDI flows (e.g. Nicholson, 
2007; Seyoum, 2006; Smarzynska Javorcik, 2004). Two studies focused on the effects of the 
regulatory structure of host IP institutions on inward FDI and found a positive relationship 
(Smarzynska Javorcik, 2004; Seyoum, 2006). Smarzynska Javorcik (2004) also included a 
second variable to account for the strength of the enforcement related aspects of host IP 
institutions of transition economies and found the same positive relationship with inward FDI. 
Such positive effects have also been confirmed for all country samples considered in the study 
of Seyoum (2006), including those of countries with weak regulatory IP institutional strength. 
In contrast, Khoury and Peng (2011) studied the IP regulatory reforms of 18 Latin American 
countries and found that those countries that reformed their IP institutions earlier than the 
others in the sample experienced a negative effect on their inward FDI flows. However, the 
authors still found a positive effect on inward FDI for those early IP reforming countries that 
had an established innovation base at the time of the reforms. Finally, an early study by Kondo 
(1995) found no relationship between stronger IP levels and inward FDI. 
In relation to the effect of the strength of IP institutions on OFDI, all studies in the existing 
literature have focused on the outward flows originating from developed countries that offer 
strong IP institutions such as the US, Japan, Germany and France. The results are generally 
consistent in that host countries with strong IP institutions are found to attract higher OFDI 
levels (Bascavusoglu & Zuniga, 2002; Branstetter et al., 2007; Lee & Mansfield, 1996; 
Ushijima, 2013). There is strong empirical evidence to suggest that US OFDI is positively 
affected by the strength of the regulatory structure of IP institutions (Branstetter et al., 2007; 
Lee & Mansfield, 1996; McCalman, 2004). For example, Branstetter et al. (2007) found patent 
regulatory reforms over the years 1989-1999 to have a positive effect on US OFDI, especially 
from patent intensive industries. This result was also confirmed by Canals and Şener (2014) 
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but only for the high-tech industries of the sample, as the effect of strong IP on low-tech 
industries was found to be insignificant. Strong levels of patent regulations were also found to 
be important for US OFDI from Hollywood (McCalman, 2004) as well as to influence the 
volume and composition of US FDI (Lee & Mansfield, 1996). 
The effect of the regulative structures of IP institutions is also found to stimulate OFDI 
from Japan and Germany but not from France (Bascavusoglu & Zuniga, 2002; Pfister & 
Deffains, 2005; Ushijima, 2013). Ushijima (2013) found a positive relationship between the 
strength of patent legislation of 58 countries and Japanese OFDI levels for the years 1985-
2004. Japanese OFDI is particularly found to be influenced by the strength of patent legislation 
when investing in countries with high imitative abilities (Ushijima, 2013). The same effect 
applies for the OFDI from Germany to 38 countries over the years 1992-2000 (Bascavusoglu 
& Zuniga, 2002). In contrast, strengthening IP levels are found to have no effect on the OFDI 
from France for the years 1959-1994 (Pfister & Deffains, 2005). More specifically, the 
strengthening of the regulative structures of IP institutions is found to have a negative effect 
on French OFDI in those countries with a large market as well as those that are characterized 
by relatively low levels of R&D intensity (Etienne & Bruno, 2005). Overall, the existing 
literature generally suggests that strong IP institutions have a positive effect on OFDI from 
developed countries. 
The Effect of IP Institutions on Chinese OFDI  
While the existing literature studying the effect of strong IP institutions on OFDI appears to be 
maturing, the potential effect of host country IP institutional strength on OFDI originating from 
EMs such as China has not yet received scholarly attention. Chinese OFDI is faced with 
significant IP institutional challenges especially when investing in geographic regions such as 
Europe, where the strength of the effectiveness of 
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between different European countries. As Table 2 shows, some European countries such as 
Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands offer strong levels of IP enforcement, whereas others 
such as Greece, Poland, and Slovakia offer weak levels of IP enforcement, similar to the level 
of IP enforcement strength offered in China. This is because even though the IP regulatory 
structure of most European countries is generally strong, partly due to the influence of 
international treaties such as the TRIPs agreement and European agencies such as the European 
Patent Office (EPO) (EPO’s members include countries outside the European Union), there is 
currently no similar co-ordination or obligation for the enforcement related aspects of IP 
institutions. IP enforcement is organised and delivered at the national level and the strength of 
effectiveness is affected by the national normative and cognitive IP structures that underpin the 
actions of local institutional agents. Although there are plans to centralise certain enforcement 
related aspects of the IP institutions at the European level, such as the proposals for the Unified 
Patent Court, these have not yet materialized (Unified Patent Court, 2017). Therefore, the 
strength of IP institutions in European countries (but also most developed and developing WTO 
member countries) is predominantly determined by the way that the normative and cognitive 
structures affect IP institutional agents and the effectiveness with which they enforce IP law in 
practice. Overall, studying the effect of the strength of the IP institutions of European countries 
on OFDI levels from China showcases how different levels of IP institutional strength in one 
IP diverse geographic region can affect Chinese OFDI. 
As the institutional escapism view suggests, weak institutional and environment factors 
and high institutional costs at home may push Chinese firms to invest abroad in pursuit of more 
efficient institutions outside China (Boisot & Meyer, 2008; Luo, Xue, & Han, 2010; Witt & 
Lewin, 2007; Yamakawa, Peng, & Deeds, 2008). The Chinese IP institutional conditions have 
not been conducive to the effective exploitation of IP assets by Chinese firms in their home 
country (Nolan, 2001; Rui & Yip, 2008). On the one hand, IP rights are not a prerequisite to 
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achieving commercial success in the home market due to the weak enforcement of IP laws. 
Even when Chinese firms are found to infringe the IP of other firms, the resulting penalties, 
damages or other legal implications are often disproportionately small compared to the 
revenues, advances in know-how and commercialization achieved (Li, 2002a, 2002b). The 
normative and cognitive structures in countries with strong IP institutions are aligned with the 
regulatory structures and the institutional actors involved in the enforcement of IP rights 
implement the letter of the law in practice. Therefore, countries with strong IP institutions are 
expected to provide effective enforcement to the rights of the IP-owning firms and would allow 
Chinese firms to successfully appropriate the returns from their R&D investments and 
internally developed or acquired IP assets. 
Chinese investments in Europe have drastically increased over the last fifteen years, with 
Chinese firms investing $55 billion US dollars in 2014 alone (Le Corre & Sepulchre, 2016). 
Chinese firms in Europe engage in both greenfield investments as well as mergers and 
acquisitions with local companies. A number of Chinese firms have undertaken greenfield 
investments in Europe to set up R&D centres as well as to penetrate European markets by 
utilizing their existing IP asset-supported business models. For example, Huawei established 
18 R&D centres in eight European countries since entering Europe (Huawei Europe, 2015). 
Operating in countries with strong IP institutions can allow firms like Huawei to confidently 
innovate and efficiently commercialize their new innovations in a tight appropriability regime, 
since IP leakage and IP theft are expected to be effectively prosecuted and penalised by the IP 
enforcement authorities of the host country (Teece, 1986). Furthermore, other Chinese firms 
that aim to access European markets, but operate with business models that are easy to copy, 
also benefit from operating in countries with strong IP institutions with effective IP 
enforcement. For instance, this is the case for firms in the bicycle rental market such as Mobike 
(owned by Beijing Mobike Technology Co., Ltd), whose fully station-less premium bicycle 
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renting business model can be easily replicated by competing firms (Cendrowski, 2017). 
Mobike’s business model is supported by 30 internally developed patents relating to e.g., the 
“smart lock” system found in all its bicycles as well as the design of their magnesium alloy 
wheels (Zhang & Yan, 2017). Operating in countries with strong IP institutions can enable 
companies like Mobike (which entered the UK in 2017) to utilize their business models and 
benefit from their innovations while seeking to block competing firms who may infringe their 
IP assets. With regards to mergers and acquisitions, a number of studies indicate that Chinese 
OFDI is also aimed at accessing and acquiring strategic assets, such as IP assets and brand 
names (Buckley et al., 2007; Luo & Tung, 2007; Rugman & Li, 2007). For example, Chinese 
investors have acquired traditional IP intensive European manufacturers, such as Geely’s 
acquisition of the Swedish automotive manufacturer Volvo in 2008 (Clark, 2010), and China 
National Chemical Corporation (ChemChina)’s acquisition of the Italian tyre manufacturer 
Pirelli in 2015 (Arosio & Masoni, 2015). Operating in countries with strong and effective IP 
institutions can enable Chinese firms to successfully defend, exploit, and profit from their new 
IP assets. Overall, we expect that strong IP institutions will attract higher levels of Chinese 
OFDI, which leads to the development of the first hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1a: European countries that provide strong IP institutions will attract higher 
levels of Chinese OFDI. 
Chinese OFDI in Europe however also includes the investments of firms with IP light 
business models, which can be exposed to the risk of IP litigation by competitors in the IP 
institution of a host country. The potential threat of IP litigation from competing firms with 
established IP portfolios can jeopardise the investments of Chinese firms in countries with 
effective IP institutions. This is because Chinese firms could be faced with potentially heavy 
costs of IP litigation, settlement costs and a potential prolonged threat of a ban from operating 
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in a host market. The average cost of patent litigation is estimated to be in the region of  
$2.8 million and the average disruption that firms face due to IP litigation is found to be 
between 18 and 36 months (De Leon & Donoso, 2017). For example, firms sued for patent 
infringement in Germany experienced negative effects on their performance, irrespective of 
settling or losing a patent trial (Schliessler, 2015). This negative effect is especially evident in 
firms that are small or less experienced with patent litigation (Schliessler, 2015). Operating in 
countries with strong IP institutions therefore can also increase the transactions costs and risks 
to Chinese firms with IP light business models. Investing in countries where IP institutions are 
weak in terms of ineffective IP enforcement can enable such firms to avoid IP litigation from 
competing firms, or to anticipate that any potential IP litigation from competitors would be 
unlikely to significantly disrupt their investments and affect their performance. Importantly, 
since Chinese firms are familiar with operating in a weak IP enforcement institution at home, 
they may find it more suitable and effective to invest in countries where IP enforcement is 
weak, so that they can successfully exploit their existing home country business model. 
In addition, Chinese firms are expected to invest less in countries where the strength of IP 
institutions is medium, due to the unpredictability of the level of IP enforcement effectiveness. 
On the one hand, Chinese firms with established IP portfolios could be faced with high 
transaction costs when engaging in IP enforcement activities in such host markets, making it 
difficult to effectively profit from their IP. This is because it is questionable if countries with 
medium IP institutional strength can provide the necessary environment in which firms can 
effectively and efficiently enforce and exploit their IP rights (Papageorgiadis & Sharma, 2016). 
On the other hand, Chinese firms with IP light business models may invest less in countries 
with medium IP institutional strength since the likelihood of facing successful IP enforcement 
actions against them is also higher and unpredictable. We therefore expect that:  
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Hypothesis 1b: The strength of European IP institutions has a U-shaped relationship with 
Chinese Outward FDI.  
China and European countries that were members of the FEB have experienced similar 
changes in their institutional infrastructure while in the process of transitioning from planned 
towards market-based economies (Peng & Heath, 1996). Taking Russia and China as an 
example, both countries followed similar ways to configure policies such as for the 
development of their innovation systems (Li, Butel, & Wang, 2017), as well as both their 
institutional contexts emphasize on establishing “relational networks” (Hitt, Ahlstrom, Dacin, 
Levitas, & Svobodina, 2004: 175). Although FEB countries have drastically changed the 
regulatory structures of their institutions, the normative and cognitive structures are still 
experiencing a slow process of transformation (Meyer & Peng, 2005). The new regulatory 
structures are not yet fully accepted or seen as legitimate by the institutional agents of FEB 
countries and this affects the strength and quality of the enforcement of the law in practice. 
This is because “…the shortage economy during the communist era has institutionalised some 
of the informal networking practices…” (Meyer & Peng, 2005: 612). Such informal practices 
are manifested when “agency relationships are complex and vaguely defined” (Filatotchev, 
Wright, Uhlenbruck, Tihanyi, & Hoskisson, 2003: 603; Meyer & Peng, 2005) and personal 
relationships (Ledeneva, 1999) can play a dominant role in successful business activity in FEB 
countries. Therefore, legislative bodies can still suffer from high levels of corruption, the 
judiciary can be inconsistent, and enforcement agencies may not be effective in monitoring and 
enforcing the law in practice (Anttonen, Tuunanen, & Alon, 2005; Carruthers & Ariovich, 
2004). The institutions of FEB countries are therefore considered to be relatively weak and 
tend to be characterized by inconsistency and instability (Meyer, 2001). 
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Operating in institutionally weak countries is generally expected to increase the transaction 
costs of foreign firms since they “have to adapt their strategies to the local institutions and 
reduce exposure to highly imperfect markets” (Meyer, 2001: 375). However, this is not 
expected to be the case for most Chinese firms since, to succeed in their home country, they 
have already developed strong capabilities in building business and institutional network ties 
with institutional agents (Buckley et al., 2007; Peng, 1997; Yiu, Lau, & Bruton, 2007). 
Therefore, while the transaction costs of operating in FEB countries may be high for most firms 
from developed economies (Meyer, 2001), the familiarity with the normative and cognitive 
institutional conditions in FEB countries can be desirable and a source of competitive 
advantage for Chinese firms (Peng, 1997; Peng & Heath, 1996). The weak institutional 
conditions in FEB countries may be particularly attractive to Chinese firms with both 
established (internally developed or acquired) and light IP portfolios. This is because the 
weaker the overall and IP institutional conditions in a host country, the higher the opportunities 
for Chinese firms to successfully navigate and mobilize the institutional agents to their 
advantage through the building of network and institutional ties (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 
2008; Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2011). On the one hand, Chinese firms with established IP 
portfolios will find it easier to operate with the same business model when operating in FEB 
countries as the one used at home, since they are familiar with the IP and overall institutional 
challenges and will seek to replicate their home-based approach to appropriating the returns of 
their IP assets. Therefore, while Chinese firms will not be able to achieve the tight 
appropriability conditions as in countries with strong IP institutions, they are expected to select 
investments that are more suitable for the capturing of market share in FEB countries, and 
follow the same business models as the ones at home. On the other hand, and in line with the 
discussion in the previous section, Chinese firms with IP light business models are also 
expected to face limited exposure to IP litigation in a FEB host country. In fact, the weaker the 
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strength of the IP institution of a FEB country, the clearer and more predictable the IP 
institutional conditions are expected to be for IP light Chinese firms. We therefore expect that: 
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between the strength of IP institutions and Chinese OFDI 
is negatively moderated by a host country’s membership of the Former Eastern Bloc. 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
We formulate and estimate three different models for a sample of 23 European countries during 
the period 2003-2015. In particular, the first model attempts to capture the impact of the 
strength of IP institutions as well as the impact of a vector of control variables on Chinese 
OFDI levels; in the second model, we introduce a squared term of the index measuring the 
strength of IP institutions to capture potential nonlinearities existing in the specification of the 
model. In the third model, we interact a dummy variable that captures if a country was a 
member of the FEB (or not) with the strength of IP institutions to identify if it moderates the 
effect of host country IP institutions on Chinese OFDI. The 23 European countries included in 
the study are presented in Table 3. 
---------------------------------------Table 3 around here--------------------------------------- 
The Variables 
Dependent Variable  
The dependent variable of this study is annual Chinese outward FDI flows for the period 2003-
2015 in 23 European countries. Data on Chinese OFDI are sourced from the publicly accessible 
OFDI dataset provided by the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China 
(MOFCOM) in the Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment 
(MOFCOM, 2009, 2015). The use of OFDI flow data is in line with the flow data used by 
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previous studies in the literature, such as Buckley et al. (2007) who used OFDI flow data and 
Khoury and Peng (2011) who used inward FDI flow data.  
Independent - Control Variables 
The main independent variable of this study is the strength of enforcement of European IP 
institutions, which is used to proxy for the effect of normative and cognitive IP structures on 
IP institutional agents involved in the enforcement of IP law in practice. We use the index of 
Papageorgiadis et al. (2014) to estimate the strength of enforcement of IP institutions. This 
index follows the theoretical underpinnings of transaction cost theory, and estimates the level 
of transaction costs that IP-owning firms face when engaging with enforcement related 
institutional agents of a national patent system. A country’s score is the aggregate of three 
transaction cost constructs, namely: a) servicing costs, b) property right protection costs, and 
c) monitoring costs. The monitoring cost construct measures the costs that firms experience 
when they engage with the enforcement agencies of a country. The property rights protection 
cost construct measures the costs that originate from the effectiveness of the judiciary of a 
country. The servicing cost construct accounts for the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
administration process by public and private agencies. High scores in the index indicate an 
effective IP institution, where IP-owning firms experience low transaction costs when 
interacting with IP institutional agents and are able to effectively enforce their IP. Lower scores 
suggest that IP-owning firms are faced with an ineffective IP institution, and therefore find it 
difficult to enforce their rights.  
We incorporate in our model a number of control variables that have been used inter alia 
as main determinants of outward FDI by previous research studies in the literature (e.g., 
Buckley et al., 2007; Kang & Jiang, 2012; Kolstad & Wiig, 2012). These are: GDP growth 
rate, population, exchange rate, geographical distance between the host economy and China, 
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inflation, openness, a squared term of the index of IP strength, a dummy variable capturing 
past membership in FEB countries in the dataset and a slope dummy where we interact the 
dummy with the IP index. For a more comprehensive review, see Chakrabarti (2001) and 
Blonigen (2005).  
The growth rate of GDP is inserted to capture the market potential of an economy, whilst 
population is used to proxy for the market size of the respective economies.2 Existing evidence 
suggests that market potential and market size are positively related to FDI inflows since 
economic growth acts as a catalyst for the efficient utilization of resources and the exploitation 
of economies of scale via FDI (Chakrabarti, 2001; UNCTAD, 1998). Recently, additional 
evidence suggests that Chinese multinationals target large and growing markets in particular 
(Buckley et al., 2007; Kang & Jiang, 2012; Kolstad & Wiig, 2012). An additional independent 
variable that we have incorporated in our model is the exchange rate, which is a proxy for the 
real effective exchange rate (Buckley et al., 2007). An appreciated exchange rate in a host 
country discourages inward FDI, whilst a depreciation of the exchange rate encourages inward 
FDI, as foreign currency denominated assets become more affordable (Kohlhagen, 1977; 
Logue & Willet, 1977; Stevens, 1993). It is expected that a relative depreciation of the host 
country's currency would lead to an increase in Chinese OFDI. Geographical distance is 
another variable that serves as a determinant of OFDI. Loungani, Mody, and Razin (2002) 
argue that the flow of FDI to nearby countries is predicted to be greatest, suggesting that a 
negative effect of geographic distance on the flow of FDI is envisaged. Inflation, apart from 
distorting the real picture of the economy, creates uncertainty and discourages market-seeking 
                                                          
2
 It should be noted that we have run additional estimations for the same and different time 
periods, using alternative proxies for the size of the market such as income per capita (PPP), 
and the results are consistent with the reported estimations.   
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FDI (Buckley et al., 2007). It may also lead to domestic currency devaluation, as well as 
discouraging export-oriented FDI through increases in the price of locally sourced inputs. As 
a result, higher levels of inflation rate in a host country are expected to be negatively related to 
Chinese OFDI. The level of openness to trade of a host country is also widely considered to 
attract FDI investments. The more extrovert, and hence the more open a country is to 
international trade, the more likely it is to attract FDI (Chakrabarti, 2001; Kang & Jiang, 2012; 
Wei, Zheng, Liu, & Lu, 2014). The lagged dependent OFDI variable reflects the dynamic 
specification of our model, and is envisaged as acting as a catalyst in attracting future OFDI 
flows. We expect that past success in attracting inward investment is likely to have a positive 
effect on future inward investment flows. We also incorporate a dummy variable in the 
estimation, which captures the potential impact of past membership of the FEB, and expect that 
it will have a positive effect in attracting Chinese OFDI due to the overall institutional 
similarities between the FEB countries and China. We furthermore incorporate a slope dummy 
in the estimation where the index of Papageorgiadis et al. (2014) is allowed to interact with the 
FEB dummy variable to test Hypothesis 2. Table 4 below includes a description of all the 
variables, details of their measurement and the sources from where we obtained the data. 
---------------------------------------Table 4 around here--------------------------------------- 
Model Specification 
The empirical specification of the OFDI regressions is a variant of the standard specifications 
encountered in the literature (see Buckley et al., 2007; Kolstad & Wiig, 2012; Ramasamy, 
Yeung, & Laforet, 2012). In view of the dynamic component of our regression specification as 
well as the measuring of the relationship between OFDI and the macroeconomic variables, 
especially GDP growth, openness and the real effective exchange rate, endogeneity concerns 
are raised (see Walsh & You, 2010). To address these, we utilize the Generalized Method of 
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Moments (GMM) originated by Holtz-Eakin (1988) and further developed by Arellano and 
Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995). The GMM approach can overcome a number of 
econometric problems encountered during estimation, such as: bi-directional causality between 
variables; the possible endogeneity of explanatory variables, as well as omitted variable biases; 
time invariant country characteristics (fixed effects), which may be correlated with the 
explanatory variables; and the presence of autocorrelation (Anderson & Hsiao, 1981; Caselli, 
Esquivel, & Lefort, 1996). A more comprehensive insight relating to the technical aspects of 
the underlying methodological framework is provided by Arellano and Bover (1995). 
The dataset used spans the period from 2003 to 2015, consisting of N cross sectional units, 
denoted i = 1,…, N observed at T time periods, denoted t = 1,…, T. More specifically, y is a 
(TN×1) vector of endogenous variables, x is a (TN×k) matrix of exogenous variables, which 
does not include a column of units for the constant term. In this context, we collated data for a 
cross-section of 23 European economies (N = 23), over a period of 13 years (T = 13).  
Apart from establishing the significance of potential determinants of OFDI, the main 
objective of this study is to effectively gauge the impact of the strength of European IP 
institutions on Chinese OFDI, given the different IP strength characteristics of the European 
countries in the sample, and distance from the Chinese IP institutions.  
In doing so, we estimate various regression specifications, the explicit form of which is 
expressed as follows:   
 = 	 +  +  +  +  +  +  +
 +  + 

 + 	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 ∗ +            (1) 
  =  ! + "                   (2) 
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where OFDI is outward foreign direct investment from China to European countries, GDP 
is the growth rate of the gross domestic product of the respective countries, POP denotes 
population, DIST is geographical distance between Beijing and the host capital cities in Europe, 
INF stands for the inflation rate, ER is the exchange rate, OP proxies a measure of trade 
openness and IPS is the Papageorgiadis et al. (2014) index of patent systems strength, IPS2 is 
the squared term, DUM is the part member of FEB country dummy, and IPS*DUM is the 
interaction term; ut is the disturbance term, vi captures the unobserved country specific effect, 
while eit is the idiosyncratic error. This is a one-way error component regression model, where 
vi ~ IIN (0, σ2) and independent of eit  ~ IIN (0, σ2). The descriptive statistics of the variables 
are provided in Table 5 below.  
---------------------------------------Table 5 around here----------------------------- 
Apart from the GMM equations, alternative model specifications such as pooled and fixed 
effects models were also formulated and effectively estimated, but, due to the inherent 
inconsistencies permeating the dynamic specification of these models, we resorted to reporting 
only the most reliable estimates, i.e. the GMM-SYS estimates. A battery of robustness tests 
based on the econometric literature have been performed to ensure that the system-GMM 
estimator is free from instrument proliferation, weak instruments and under-identification.  In 
particular, Roodman (2009) shows that a great number of instruments can potentially result in 
an over-fitting of the model, hence producing biased estimations. In this case, Hansen tests may 
produce very high p-values. In view of the above, we adopted two ways of restricting the 
number of instruments used in the system-GMM estimations. The first is to collapse the 
instrument sets, and the second is to use specific lags instead of any possible lag length for 
instruments. The problems however of under-identification or weak instruments in the system-
GMM estimations may persist even when the number of instruments has been reduced 
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significantly (Bazzi & Clemens, 2013; Murray, 2006). The strength of our instruments is 
therefore checked through the Kleibergen–Paap rk Wald F (K–P rk Wald F) statistic test. It 
should also be mentioned that a cross-correlation matrix (see Table 6 below) and a Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) were employed to check for multicollinearity. Both approaches 
suggested that existing collinear relationships were kept to a minimum, as the average VIF 
score was 3.6, when a common rule of thumb is that VIF scoring higher than 10 may constitute 
a legitimate cause for concern (Kutner et al., 2004). 
---------------------------------------Table 6 around here--------------------------------------- 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The results of the three models that test the effect of the strength of European IP institutions on 
Chinese OFDI are available in Table 7 below.3 With regards to Hypothesis 1a of our study, the 
                                                          
3
 It is important to mention that one of the concerns in the use of Chinese OFDI data is that 
Chinese investments abroad may be driven by policy (political) instead of business reasons. 
For example, the “Opinions on Deepening the Reform of the Science and Technology System 
and Speeding up the Building of the National Innovation System” by the State Council of China 
in 2012 was a major initiative aimed at boosting the technological upgrading of Chinese firms. 
Such initiatives could dilute the results of studies since more Chinese firms may have embarked 
on OFDI from e.g. 2012 onwards, just to satisfy this national initiative, while the consideration 
of IP institutions may have been of secondary importance. We would like to highlight that 
during the review process, we have run the estimations using Chinese OFDI data for the years 
1998-2011 and the results were fully consistent with the results reported here in terms of both 
direction of the effect and significance. Due to space considerations, the additional results are 
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evidence obtained from the first model shows a positive (at the 5% level) relationship between 
Chinese OFDI and levels of IP institutional strength in European countries. Hypothesis 1a is 
therefore confirmed, in that strong IP institutions where the normative and cognitive structures 
are aligned with the regulatory structure and lead to the effective enforcement of IP, attract 
higher levels of Chinese OFDI. The magnitude of the effect suggests that a one unit increase 
in the index of Papageorgiadis et al. (2014) would be expected to cause Chinese OFDI flows 
to increase by 3%. The result is consistent with the theoretical expectation and the results of 
the majority of existing studies on the relationship between IP institutions and OFDI from 
developed economies (e.g., Bascavusoglu & Zuniga, 2002; Branstetter et al., 2007; Lee & 
Mansfield, 1996; McCalman, 2004; Ushijima, 2013). This is an important finding for the 
literature on OFDI from emerging countries (e.g., Hoskisson, Wright, Filatotchev, & Peng, 
2013; Luo & Tung, 2007; Yamakawa et al., 2008), since this is the first study that identifies 
the importance of strong host country IP institutions for Chinese firms. In addition, given that 
most of the existing work in the area focused in the years prior to the implementation of the 
TRIPs agreement in the year 2000, the findings of this study demonstrate the continued 
importance of IP institutions after TRIPs. Importantly, while in the years prior to the 
implementation of the TRIPs agreement the strength of IP institutions appeared to matter for 
the OFDI decisions of firms from developed markets, the results showcase that in the years 
after TRIPs, the strength of IP institutions is also a determinant of the OFDI of firms from 
emerging markets. 
---------------------------------------Table 7 around here--------------------------------------- 
                                                          
available upon request. We would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers and the Editor 
for this comment. 
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Chinese firms investing abroad in the 2003-2015 time period aimed to improve their 
competitiveness at the global level (Deng, 2013; Hong & Sun, 2006; Wei et al., 2014) by fully 
exploiting their internally developed or acquired IP assets. Strong IP institutions in host 
European countries can enable Chinese firms to escape from the weak IP institutional 
framework existing in China (Luo et al., 2010; Yamakawa et al., 2008) and fully utilize their 
existing IP supported business models. This is because even if many of the Chinese firms are 
market leaders in China, the lack of a developed IP framework at home (Nolan, 2001; Rui & 
Yip, 2008) can make it more difficult for Chinese firms to fully utilize their IP assets and 
efficiently appropriate the returns to their innovations (Teece, 1986). Therefore, operating in 
strong IP institutions can enable Chinese firms to utilize their IP portfolios and fully exploit 
the returns to their internally developed or acquired innovations (Lu, Liu, & Wang, 2011; 
Ramasamy et al., 2012; Wei et al., 2014; Yiu et al., 2007). Operating in tight appropriability 
regimes, risks can be anticipated and IP infringement can be successfully managed due to the 
effectiveness of the enforcement related institutional agents. Strong IP institutions can also 
allow Chinese firms to further develop and better utilize their business models, by, for example, 
achieving to effectively block competitors who may be infringing their IP (Cendrowski, 2017). 
It is important to note however that the magnitude of the identified effect of IP institutions on 
Chinese OFDI suggests that there is still a large percentage of unexplained variance that 
probably relates to the effect of other variables and perhaps the way that IP institutions interact 
with them, which will need to be examined further in future studies. 
With regards to Hypothesis 1b, the weakly significant results of the second model suggest 
that the strength of European IP institutions might have a U-shaped relationship (at the 10% 
level) with Chinese OFDI. While the significance level of the result is weak, it reveals a 
potentially different and intriguing pattern in that Chinese OFDI could be attracted by both 
strong and weak IP systems, but not moderate ones. Hypothesis 1b is therefore not confirmed 
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however we find some evidence that European countries offering a moderate level of IP 
institutional strength may send negative mixed signals to Chinese investments (Papageorgiadis 
& Sharma, 2016). European IP institutions of moderate strength may be unpredictable for 
Chinese firms which would prefer to avoid the risk of entering potentially lengthy and costly 
IP enforcement efforts when defending their IP assets or when being sued for the infringement 
of the IP of third parties.  
The results of Model 3, which test Hypothesis 2, reveal that the effect of the strength of IP 
institutions on Chinese OFDI is moderated by a host country’s past membership of the FEB. 
We find that the effect of the strength of IP institutions on Chinese OFDI is negative (at the 
5% level) when Chinese investments are directed to FEB countries. This result provides more 
support to the potential U-shaped effect of Hypothesis 1b and particularly regarding the 
existence of the negative effect. The magnitude of the effect suggests that in countries that were 
members of the FEB, a one unit increase of the index of Papageorgiadis et al. (2014) would be 
expected to cause Chinese OFDI flows to decrease by 5%. Therefore, the lower the strength of 
the IP institutions of FEB countries, the higher the Chinese OFDI received. When operating in 
FEB countries, Chinese firms can benefit from the incongruence of the normative and cognitive 
structures with the regulatory ones (Li et al., 2017) and the associated dominance of informal 
networking practices to mobilize the IP institutions (Buckley et al., 2007; Yiu et al., 2007). 
Chinese companies have established strong capabilities in developing business and institutional 
network ties with institutional agents in their home country where the institutional environment 
is similar to those of their targeted FEB countries (Meyer & Peng, 2005; Peng, 1997; Peng & 
Heath, 1996). Chinese businesses therefore perceive that the weaker the IP institution of a FEB 
country is, the higher the malleability of its institutional agents who could be influenced to 
support the firms’ objectives (Brander et al., 2017; Peng et al., 2017). Chinese firms with 
business models that are either supported by established IP portfolios or not, anticipate to 
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influence the IP institutions and mould them to achieve their desired (loose) appropriability 
conditions. Overall, this result provides more support and further explains the negative slope 
of the potential U-shaped effect in Model 2. The majority of the control variables included in 
the estimations have a significant effect on Chinese OFDI, bearing the expected sign in all three 
empirical models. First, the lagged OFDI variable is found to have a significant positive effect 
on Chinese OFDI indicating that past investments from Chinese firms in a host country tend to 
encourage future investment (Lipsey, 1999). Population is found to have a significant positive 
effect on Chinese OFDI (Chakrabarti, 2001). We also found GDP growth to have a significant 
positive effect on Chinese OFDI flows in Europe, result which is aligned with the theoretical 
expectations. In addition, market openness is also found to have a significant positive effect on 
Chinese OFDI. The exchange rate of a host country is found to have a weak positive effect in 
all three empirical estimations, suggesting that a depreciated exchange rate in a host country 
encourages inward FDI (Kohlhagen, 1977; Logue & Willet, 1977; Stevens, 1993). Like 
Ramasamy et al. (2012) we find that inflation does not have an effect on Chinese OFDI. This 
result, however, is different from other studies (such as Buckley et al., 2007; Kang & Jiang, 
2012) that suggested a significant positive effect of inflation on Chinese OFDI. The 
insignificant role of inflation on Chinese OFDI in our study could be attributed to the time-
period studied. Inflation rates have been less volatile in most European countries during the 
years 2003-2015 and therefore it could be expected that they neither posed a high risk, nor 
encouraged Chinese OFDI in the host economies. Finally, we find that geographic distance has 
a negative effect (at the 5% level) on Chinese OFDI in Model 1, but the result is not consistent 
across all estimations. While the result from Model 1 is aligned with the findings of the 
previous literature (Loungani et al., 2002), more research is needed to shed more light on the 
effect of geographic distance on Chinese OFDI, especially for investments directed at one 
specific geographic region (Europe).   
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CONCLUSIONS 
This paper focuses on the variable levels of strength of the IP institutions of 23 European 
countries and studies their effect on Chinese OFDI over the period 2003-2015. We find that 
the strength of IP institutions has a positive effect in attracting higher levels of OFDI from 
China. This result provides the first empirical evidence in the literature on the importance of 
the strength of IP institutions for OFDI from EMs. This finding is aligned with the results of 
studies focusing on OFDI from developed countries, in that strong IP institutions provide 
desirable conditions that attract higher levels of OFDI (Nicholson, 2007; Seyoum, 2006; 
Smarzynska Javorcik, 2004). Strong IP institutions can enable Chinese IP-owning firms, which 
are often market leaders in the Chinese market, to confidently engage in innovation activities 
in the host country as well as to effectively exploit their internally developed or acquired IP 
assets. This is because in countries with strong IP institutions, the normative and cognitive IP 
institutional structures are congruent and supportive to the (externally influenced due to TRIPs) 
IP regulatory structure. In such countries, IP institutional agents consider the regulatory 
structures as legitimate and acceptable, and effectively enforce IP law in practice.  
We also find a weak indication of a potential U-shaped relationship between the strength 
of IP institutions and Chinese OFDI, result which is further supported by the finding that a 
country’s membership of the FEB negatively moderates the effect of the strength of IP 
institutions on Chinese OFDI. When investing in FEB countries, Chinese firms may be 
attracted to weaker IP institutions due to the normative and cognitive general institutional 
similarities of the host countries with the institutional conditions in China. A common 
institutional characteristic in countries transitioning from centrally planned to market 
economies is the need for firms to develop business and institutional ties that can enable them 
to navigate and influence the institutional environment (Buckley et al., 2007; Yiu et al., 2007). 
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Therefore, the weaker the IP institutional strength in a FEB host country is, the higher the 
opportunity for a Chinese firm to develop ties with institutional agents and, for example, avoid 
or minimize the impact of potential IP enforcement actions by competitors. Overall, Chinese 
investments appear to avoid investing in countries offering moderate levels of IP strength, 
probably due to the unpredictability of the institutional costs that Chinese firms may face when 
operating in such markets. 
The results of this study raise important business and policy implications. For European 
and policy-makers from advanced economies, our study provides the first empirical evidence 
that the strength of national IP institutions attracts higher levels of OFDI from China. While 
the importance of the strength of IP institutions in attracting Chinese OFDI may have been 
underestimated in the past mainly due to the lack of available evidence, European policy 
makers need to, on the one hand, continue supporting the strengthening of their IP institutions 
and on the other, focus on understanding the specific challenges that Chinese firms face when 
dealing with European IP institutions. The latter is important because Chinese investments 
appear to avoid the IP institutions offering moderate levels of strength. European policy makers 
need to gain an understanding and provide support to Chinese firms that are potentially 
considering investing in countries offering moderate levels of IP institutional strength and at 
the same time countries with moderate IP institutional strength need to continue with the 
strengthening of their IP institutions in order to avoid this shortcoming in the future.  
With regards to the implications for Chinese policy makers and businesses, the results 
indicate that the Chinese firms benefit from the strengthening of the IP institutions of foreign 
countries. In addition, Chinese firms which are in the process of exploring the potential to 
internationalize in European countries should consider avoiding to invest in countries with 
moderate levels of IP institutional strength, since the IP institutional costs (actual and 
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transaction costs) in these countries can be unpredictable. This is because Chinese firms with 
established IP portfolios may find it difficult to enforce their rights in such host countries, 
whereas firms with IP light business models may be faced with potentially disruptive IP 
enforcement actions against them. Chinese policy makers should consider raising the 
importance of strengthening IP institutions in their multilateral and bilateral negotiations with 
European countries. Importantly, the results of this study also highlight the importance for 
Chinese policy-makers to continue reforming Chinese IP institutions and to achieve higher 
levels of IP institutional strength more rapidly. This will benefit Chinese firms which develop 
their IP portfolios and integrate them in their business model and allow them to more 
effectively exploit their IP assets at home. It can also further motivate “copycat” Chinese firms 
to transform into innovators (Peng et al., 2017), and exploit their innovations in foreign strong 
IP institutions. Finally, Chinese policy makers could consider developing a network of overseas 
IP- attachés (similar to the US and UK initiatives) in countries with moderate and weak IP 
institutions, to help internationalizing Chinese companies to navigate in the foreign IP 
institution and reduce their IP risks (IP Office, 2016; US Department of Commerce, 2016). 
Overall, given that this is the first study looking into the effects of IP institutional strength 
on OFDI from an emerging country, future studies could provide further insights in the 
literature by considering some of the limitations of our study. Due to the lack of more 
disaggregated publicly available data, this study utilized aggregate country level OFDI data 
published by MOFCOM. Should more disaggregated data become publicly available in the 
future, studies could research the effects of IP institutional strength at the industry and firm 
level, and include more countries in the empirical investigation. Having access to firm level 
data could also enable future studies to investigate whether the effect of host country IP 
institutional strength on OFDI from EMs is moderated by firm characteristics. Furthermore, 
future studies could investigate whether the effects of IP institutional strength are similar for 
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the OFDI from other EMs, such as India and Brazil. This is because OFDI by these emerging 
countries might be affected by IP institutional strength in different ways. For example, we can 
observe a similar pattern in OFDI from India, but also potential differences, particularly due to 
the IP related idiosyncratic behavior of the Indian pharmaceutical sector. A comparative 
approach is therefore suggested for future studies to identify the extent to which the results 
from this study can be generalized to OFDI from other EMs or developing countries. 
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Table 1. The strength of patent law (on the books) in 23 European countries 
Countries 
Index of Patent Protection Strength  
(Park, 2008) 
Year 2005 Year 2010 
Austria  4.33 4.33 
Belgium 4.67 4.67 
Czech Republic 4.33 4.33 
Denmark 4.67 4.67 
Finland 4.67 4.67 
France 4.67 4.67 
Germany 4.67 4.67 
Greece 4.47 4.47 
Hungary 4.33 4.33 
Ireland 4.67 4.67 
Italy 4.67 4.67 
Netherlands 4.67 4.67 
Norway 4.29 4,42 
Poland 3.88 4.00 
Portugal 4.33 4.33 
Russia 3.68 3.68 
Slovakia 4.21 4.33 
Spain 4.33 4.33 
Sweden 4.54 4.54 
Switzerland 4.21 4.21 
Turkey 4.01 3.88 
United Kingdom 4.54 4.54 
Ukraine 3.68 3.88 
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Table 2. The strength of the effectiveness of patent enforcement in 23 European countries for 
the year 2013 
Countries 
Index of Patent Systems 
Strength  
(Papageorgiadis et al., 2014) 
Austria  7.1 
Belgium 7.6 
Czech Republic 5.2 
Denmark 9.0 
Finland 9.0 
France 7.2 
Germany 8.0 
Greece 4.1 
Hungary 5.7 
Ireland 7.3 
Italy 4.6 
Netherlands 8.5 
Norway 8.6 
Poland 6.0 
Portugal 6.3 
Russia 3.2 
Slovakia 4.8 
Spain 6.5 
Sweden 8.8 
Switzerland 8.7 
Turkey 5.1 
United Kingdom 7.6 
Ukraine 3.1 
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Table 3. List of European host countries included in the study 
 
Austria Norway 
Belgium Poland 
Czech Rep. Portugal 
Denmark Russia  
Finland Slovakia  
France Spain  
Germany Sweden  
Greece Switzerland  
Hungary Turkey1 
Ireland UK  
Italy Ukraine  
Netherlands  
Note: (1) Turkey is included in the dataset of 
European countries because: a) it is a 
candidate country in the process of joining the 
European Union since 1987, and b) Turkey 
and the European Union have signed and 
implemented a Customs Union agreement on 
the 31st of December 1995. 
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Table 4. Variable description, measurement, and sources 
 
Variable Description/Measurement Data Source 
LOFDI Natural log of Outward FDI from China 
to host country; Unit: million-USD 
MOFCOM (2009, 2015) 
INF Inflation – Consumer Price Inflation 
(CPI) growth rate of the host country; 
CPI base year 2010 
OECD (2016) 
GDP GDP growth rate of the host country 
(based on GDP per capita in USD) 
The World Bank (2017) 
 
LPOP Natural log of population of the host 
country 
The World Bank (2017)  
 
LOP Natural log of openness of the host 
country; Measured by calculating Imports 
+ Exports / GDP 
The World Bank (2017) 
 
LDIST Natural log of geographical distance 
between Beijing and the capital city of 
the host country; Unit: KM 
Geobytes.com 
LREER Natural log of real effective exchange 
rate; Unit: LCU per US$, period average 
The World Bank (2017) 
 
IPS Index of patent systems strength Papageorgiadis et al. (2014) 
IPSSQR Index of patent systems strength squared Papageorgiadis et al. (2014) 
DUM Dummy variable assuming the value of 1 
for Former Eastern Bloc countries and 0 
for the rest of the countries in sample 
 
DUM*IPS Interaction term of index of patent 
systems strength with dummy variable of 
Eastern European countries 
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 
LOFDI 2.3 3.0 1.1 4.2 
INF 3.1 4.3 -4.5 48.7 
GDP 0.5 1.1 -0.7 7.9 
LPOP 7.5 7.5 6.6 8.2 
LOP 2.0 1.6 1.7 2.3 
LDIST 3.9 2.9 3.8 4.0 
LREER 2.0 0.9 1.8 2.1 
IPS 6.8 1.9 2.9 9.7 
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Table 6. Correlation coefficient matrix 
 
Variables LOFDI INF GDP LPOP LOP LDIST LREER IPS 
LOFDI 1        
INF 0.005 1       
GDP 0.53 0.04 1      
LPOP 0.38 0.386 0.85 1     
LOP -0.21 -0.12 -0.5 -0.53 1    
LDIST -0.02 -0.3 0.003 -0.26 0.04 1   
LREER 0.21 -0.32 0.14 -0.07 -0.07 0.2 1  
IPS 0.05 -0.45 -0.08 -0.37 0.05 0.12 0.41 1 
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Table 7. Effects of the strength of European IP institutions on Chinese OFDI 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
LOFDI(-1) 0.736*** 0.748*** 0.739*** 
 (15.99) (16.62) (16.03) 
INF 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (1.202) (1.149) (1.042) 
GDP 0.099*** 0.114*** 0.12*** 
 (4.068) (3.89) (4.344) 
LPOP 0.334*** 0.307*** 0.293*** 
 (3.883) (3.675) (3.485) 
LOP 0.407*** 0.406*** 0.414*** 
 (2.818) (2.802) (2.856) 
LDIST −0.810** -0.068 −0.476 
 (−2.097) (-0.132) (−1.172) 
LREER 1.006* 0.907* 0.999* 
 (1.822) (1.660) (1.812) 
IPS 0.029** -0.176* 0.035** 
 (2.106) (-1.628) (2.397) 
IPSSQR  0.015*  
  (1.854)  
DUM 0.004 0.035 0.47** 
 (0.93) (0.583) (2.024) 
DUM*IPS   -0.085** 
   (−2.090) 
Constant −2.521 -4.474* -3.688* 
 (−1.383) (-1.959) (−1.882) 
AR(1)a 0.027 0.021 0.061 
AR(2)b 0.873 0.128 0.092 
Hansen testc 0.992 0.892 0.671 
K–P rank Wald testd 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Number of 
instruments 34 28 32 
a Test for first-order serial correlation (p-values); b test for second-order serial 
correlation (p-values); c tests for validity of instruments; d Kleibergen–Paap rk 
Wald F – the results indicate that there is no under-identification problem for 
the difference model; Robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are 
computed and robust z statistics are reported in parentheses; time dummies have 
been used in the estimation; * , **and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 
1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
